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Forensic Science Standards in Fast-Changing 
Environments 
 
Peter Sommer 
London School of Economics & Political Science,  Open University,  UK 
 
Abstract:  Regulatory trends in forensic science point strongly to the need for 
exhaustive testing of all findings and tools.  At the same time a number of 
jurisdictions suggest a judicial test for the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence.  But in fields such computers and cellphones, the rate of change is faster 
than the normal times required for peer-reviewed publication.  One route to 
admitting less-than-perfect findings from forensic science is via a re-evaluation of 
the role of expert evidence and in particular pre-trial meetings between experts. 
 
 
This paper is based on a presentation Keeping Up: Testing Methodologies in 
Digital Forensics given at EAFS 2009 in September 2009.  It will appear in a 
forthcoming edition of Science and Justice.  Please treat this as a pre-publication 
version and check with the final version in the journal.  
 
 
 
The message from forensic science to expert witnesses is clear:  evidence tendered 
should be based on validated scientific knowledge;  all tools and procedures 
deployed should have been subject to independent testing to demonstrate 
compliance with their stated claims.   
But the establishing and validation of scientific knowledge takes time.    Even 
when the particular element is simply a modest refinement of what was already 
well-known, suitably exhaustive tests have to be carried out, a paper has to be 
prepared, this in turn has to be subjected to peer-review and then published, 
hopefully in the next edition of a relevant journal.  It is only at this point that an 
associated practical procedure can be devised and, if helpful, tools designed.  And 
then these too have to be tested and, ideally, the test results published and a 
certificate of some sort issued. 
What happens if the raw material with which you work changes at a rate faster 
than these cycles of publishing and testing?  There have been many improvements 
in the handling and analysis of DNA (RFLP,  PCR,  STR, AmpFLP, Y-
chromosome, Mitochondrial) since Alec Jeffery’s paper in 1984 indicated its value 
as a unique marker of identity,  but DNA itself has remained unaltered.  Methods 
of analysing and identifying paint fragments have also undergone a variety of 
developments over the years, but the appearance of brand new paint technologies 
(changes in pigments, binders, solvents, additives) which cannot be incorporated 
into the existing range of analytic techniques are extremely rare.   
This is not the situation with evidence derived from computers where the 
extraordinary rates of change in Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT), the very wide usage of communications networks, and the socio-cultural-
commercial environments which are thereby made possible, are all reflected in 
activities carried out by practitioners in digital forensics.    
Expert evidence around computer-related activities ought to meet the same 
verification standards as the rest of forensic science, but in practice the vast 
majority of it doesn’t and it is difficult to forecast a point at which it ever will - or 
indeed envisage the process by which this might happen.   
This creates the dilemma which I wish to explore:  if we insist on very high 
standards for the verification for scientific and technical evidence methodologies 
we run the risk of excluding material, particularly if it is digital in form, which 
might assist a court in reaching a conclusion; we could easily be letting the guilty 
go free. On the other hand, without rigour, we open the courts to becoming 
confused by junk science.  The answer, I suggest, is a re-siting of forensic science 
within the broader duties of the expert witness and looking at how existing 
features of the criminal procedure rules might be exploited or modified.  
 
Forensic Science standards for verification 
Proposals now in train seek potentially to embed the notion of exhaustive 
verification and testing into the forensic process, and to exclude any scientific and 
technical evidence which fails these criteria. 
The Law Commission’s Consultation Paper No 190 The Admissibility of Expert 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales:  a new approach to 
evidentiary reliability1 makes a provisional recommendation for a statutory test to 
determine the admissibility of expert evidence.  The test would exclude evidence 
unless it was “sufficiently reliable” and that in turn would be tested against a 
statutory list of guidelines.  One of the suggested guidelines would be a variant of 
the US Frye test2 of proof of “scientific acceptability” or the more specific 
Daubert tests3 which include publication in a peer-reviewed journal.4  The rules 
appear in Table 1.  It would be for the person hoping to tender expert evidence to 
show the judge that his/her work met the criteria for reliability.  Even if 
“publication in a peer-reviewed journal” is simply regarded as a guideline and is 
not mandatory, as few judges are likely to be have much background knowledge 
of the many sub-disciplines within forensic science, one can foresee a situation 
when the journal article criterion becomes quasi-compulsory. 
                                                 
1 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp190.pdf 
2 293 F 10113 (1923) 
3 509 US 579 (1993) 
4 The Law Commission considered four possible options: exclusionary discretion without 
guidance,  exclusionary discretion with guidance, an admissibility test requiring consensus 
amongst experts in the field; an admissibility rule requiring the trial judge to assess the evidentiary 
reliability of tendered evidence (para 4.3).  This last is close to the Daubert type of approach and 
finds greatest favour with the Law Commission (Parts 5 and 6) 
A second arena demanding very high levels of validation and testing is forensic 
science regulation.  The UK Forensic Science Regulator has been in post since 
February 2008; the role is to identify and develop quality standards among those 
providing forensic science services. 5  One of the key documents is to be called 
Quality Standards for Forensic Science Services.  It is still being formulated but a 
good idea of the approach can be seen from its Version B6  which closed for comment 
in May 2009.  Section 14 deals with “Development, validation, verification and 
implementation of new methods, products and services”.  Section 14.3.5 deals with 
“validation” and 14.3.5.2 with “objective methods”:  “For a full validation of an 
objective method, the provider shall systematically assess all the functional and 
performance requirements and the parameters/characteristics that are capable of 
influencing the result and are relevant to the intended use.”  In relation to products 
that are to deployed, the document says: “The functional and performance 
requirements of a product shall address its reliability to deliver consistent and reliable 
results in the range of circumstances in which it might be applied or used.” And 
section 15.3.5.4.1 extends this to software unless it is commercial off-the-shelf and in 
widespread general use. In all instances a validation report is required.    
There is a linked expectation that forensic science laboratories will comply with 
the ISO/IEC 17025:2005 standard which specifies the general requirements for the 
competence to carry out tests and/or calibrations, including sampling. It covers 
testing and calibration performed using standard methods, non-standard methods, 
and laboratory-developed methods7 and also places great stress on the exhaustive 
validation of methods and tools.  ISO/IEC 17025:2005 itself is based around the 
ISO 9000 series of quality standards. 
 
Computer Forensics 
The importance of the disciplines associated with the identification, acquisition 
and analysis of material from computers can be gauged by the following:  By 2008 
70% of UK homes had at least one personal computer and of those 93% had a 
broadband always-on connection to the Internet. 8  Costs of data storage (hard-
disks) halve every 18 months or so.9  A “reasonable entry-level” but actually very 
powerful personal computer can be bought on the High Street for 3 days’ earnings 
of the average worker.  Broadband brings much greater speeds and hence much 
more data per second and the monthly flat rate frees the user from the need to 
economise in Internet sessions. There are several multipliers in place: more time 
online, more data downloaded, cheaper personal computers with cheaper data 
storage has enabled experimenters and entrepreneurs to launch new data-intensive 
services such as social networking, media downloads, more extensive e-commerce 
sites, more complex and sophisticated e-banking and other financial services sites.  
                                                 
5 http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/operational-policing/forensic-science-regulator/about-the-
regulator/ 
6 http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/operational-
policing/Quality_Standards_for_FSSPs1.pdf?view=Binary 
7 http://www.iso.org/iso/Catalogue_detail?csnumber=39883 
8 Ofcom: The Consumer Experience 2008 Research Report 
9 In 2004 the cost per megabyte of a hard-disk was $1.15; in 2009 (at the time of writing) it is 5-6 
cents.  Then 250GB was thought huge; today 1500 GB disks cost about $100.  
More material downloaded and stored, and now accumulated over longer periods 
means more “digital footprints”. 
As a result, whilst in the early days of forensic computing the pre-occupations 
were ”hacking” and “computer fraud”, today there are very few crimes where 
evidence from computers does not potentially play a role.   
In practice there are fewer than 100 prosecutions per year under the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990, largely because the Crown Prosecution Service prefers to use 
what it regards as substantive statutory routes as opposed to those that refer to the 
modus operandi. Thus most “computer fraud” is handled under the Fraud Act 
2006,  s 2(5) of which specifically refers to the use of computers.  There are now 
several varieties of fraud which only exist because of the way in which the 
Internet has developed – “phishing”, e-commerce and auction frauds are obvious 
examples.   Other areas where evidence from computers has been important 
include:  child sex abuse, murder, terrorism,  software and other IP piracy,  money 
laundering,  people trafficking, narcotics importation and trafficking,  handling 
stolen goods,  harassment,  sexual assault,  electoral abuse, perjury,   attempts to 
pervert the course of justice, and police disciplinary proceedings.10  Often what 
counts is when the evidence is corroborative and indicative rather than directly 
supportive of an allegation:  very important sources are emails and Internet 
searches.  In terrorism cases the material may include downloaded bomb-making 
manuals.   The 2003 Criminal Justice Act permits prosecutors to apply to be 
allowed to admit so-called “bad character” evidence11 and computers may be a 
rich location for this by, for example, showing patterns of visits to certain 
websites.  
Computer forensics became a nascent discipline at the end of the 1980s.  Up till 
then, “computer evidence” had usually meant “computer print-out” – a paper-
based selection from a database or set of documents held on a mainframe. But the 
arrival of the personal computer, one that was not solely for the use of hobbyists 
and moreover a machine that had hard-disk storage, changed all that. Mainframe 
computers cannot be readily seized, PCs can. An entire hard-disk can be copied / 
cloned and then analysed.  This is still one of the core jobs within computer 
forensics, though capture and analysis of network traffic and the examination of 
devices such as cellphones,  PDAs,  digital cameras and portable media devices 
are also important as well. 
Examining a hard disk is not limited to simply looking for “killer fact” substantive 
files.  Files acquire a variety of date/time stamps from which chronologies can be 
built.  Modern operating systems have areas which contain configuration detail 
which speak to how a computer has been set up and used.  They have a variety of 
features to ease the user experience (such as remembering certain bits of 
information or caching activity) and to increase resilience to cope with failures.  
More modern operating systems also take snapshots of the computer at regular 
intervals and create full text indexes of the disk contents.  Data that is deleted does 
not disappear immediately but is merely marked as deleted, so that many forms of 
data recovery are possible.   
                                                 
10 These are all from the author’s own case book of instructions 
11 Criminal Justice Act 2002 Part 11Chapter 1 ss 98-107 
 Speed of Change 
But the ways in which they achieve these facilities change with each new version 
of an operating system; whilst the regular user of a computer simply notices the 
new graphics of the user interface and the changed menu items, what is going on 
under the hood changes dramatically as well.  Consider Table 2 – this is a highly 
simplified history of the family of operating systems used on over 90% of PCs. 
Looking simply at the differences between Windows XP and its successor Vista: 
many of the basic locations for critical files were changed, there were new file and 
disk back-up facilities, new ways of recording time and date stamps,  in-built disk 
indexing,  a substantially changed system for email storage, and many other 
alterations and new features too extensive and complex to list here12.   The table, 
in its highly abbreviated form, significantly under-states the frequency of change.  
Individual versions of operating systems are also the subjects of updating – there 
have been three “Service Packs” for Windows XP, for example.  But beyond 
these, as most Windows users know only too well, minor updates are provided 
once a week.  When these updates occur, although there is often some explanation 
of what they are supposed to offer, the ways in which they do so are usually highly 
opaque. 
However, this is just the changes to operating systems.  Over the same period, 
since 1984, there have been important developments in the way in which hard-
disks are designed and how they interface, physically and logically, to a computer. 
Without an understanding of these changes, any device which claims to be able to 
make a complete copy of hard-disk, so-called forensic disk imaging, may fail to 
capture all the data that is available.13 
More immediately visible to most users are the application programs.  Although 
even something as familiar as a word processor appears to be relatively 
unchanging over the years (see Table 3),  each new version has features which 
might be turned to forensic use. Microsoft Word can trace its history back to 1983 
and Word for Windows to 1989.  Over the years newer versions have developed 
“undo” editing facilities which can result in deleted material being recoverable and 
“properties” which retain information about where and when a document was 
originated as well as successive versions.  But subsequent versions of Word create 
more “hidden” information and different types of “properties” or “metadata” 
information.  
But many of the most common and popular applications have been in existence for 
far shorter periods.  The function of a web browser is to enable the retrieving,  
presenting and examination of information on the world wide web (www). The 
idea behind the world wide web dates from 1991.  Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, 
now at Version 8, appeared in 1995 but took some time to gain traction.  Other 
browsers include Opera, Firefox,  Safari and Chrome.   Table 4 shows a list of the 
                                                 
12  http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1889 for a overview;  Windows Vista and Digital 
Investigations, Hargreaves, Chivers,  Titheridge,  Digital Investigation,  Volume 5, Issues 1-2, 
September 2008, Pages 34-48 
13 A systematic evaluation of disk imaging in EnCase 6.1 and LinEn 6.1,  Byrers and  Shahmeri,  
Digital Investigation,  Volume 6, Issues 1-2,  September 2009, Pages 71-81 
release dates of some of the key new versions of some popular browsers.  Browser 
software needs to be updated as the specification for the display and facilities of 
world wide web pages keeps evolving.    As with the table relating to operating 
systems, there are large numbers of changes within each major version.  A very 
important feature of all browser software is that stores on the user’s hard disk 
copies of the pages visited in what is called a cache.  The purpose is to speed up 
the user’s browsing experience.  As a matter of observation, during web-surfing 
certain main or index pages on a site will be revisited many times – it makes sense 
for the user to be able to look at his own cached copy of those pages rather than 
keep on requesting from the remote web-server.  To a computer forensic 
investigator the cache is invaluable because it makes possible the reconstruction of 
the user’s surfing habits.  There are other features of browsers which are 
forensically useful – facilities for the storage of passwords and to “auto-complete” 
a web-URL or a user’s personal details work because that information is held 
somewhere associated with the browser – and revealing it may assist an 
investigation.   Specialist software exists to ease this process14;  however for it to 
be useful and reliable,  such software has to be kept constantly up to date. 15    
Peer-to-Peer file (P2P) sharing services have an even shorter history.  This is one 
of the key the technologies behind high resolution video-streaming facilities such 
as the BBC IPlayer.  It is also used by academia and the computer industry to 
provide rapid access to large files.  But the various versions of P2P have also 
gained notoriety as they have been used for the sharing of copyrighted material 
such as music, games and video. They have also been used as a means of 
distributing pictures of the sexual abuse of children. Depending on how precisely 
you define the term P2P, the first popular services date only as far back as 1999, 
when Napster was launched.  Significant changes occurred between 2000 and 
2002.   All of these services require that the user has installed on his PC a “client” 
program to manage and mediate the sharing. These client programs create records 
of files searched for, downloaded and shared.    These records have been analysed 
for their forensic value16 
Even more recent has been the growth of social networking.   Facebook, with a 
claimed world-wide user base of 300 million registered users started with a 
version for US universities in 2004 and was followed by a High School version in 
2005.  It has been open to all comers only since September 2006.  During that 
period it has gone through 4 different user interfaces. Facebook claim that 120 
million of their users log on at least once a day.  LinkedIn, widely used by the 
business community launched in 2003 but only became significant in 2006;  it has 
about 50 million registered users.  And then there is Twitter, which at the time of 
                                                 
14 eg NetAnalysis, http://www.digital-detective.co.uk/netanalysis.asp 
15 There are other features of browsers which may assist the investigator, for example cookies, the 
small items of text placed there by remote websites during a visit so that, for example,  a user can 
be recognised on a subsequent visit, or to enable such features as “shopping baskets” on a e-
commerce site 
16 eg    Peer-toPeer networking issues Fellows   Digital Investigation Volume 4  Issue q pp 3-6;   
File Marshal: Automatic extraction of peer-to-peer data,  Adelstein and Joyce,  Digital 
Investigation Volume 4  Supp 1  pp 43-48 and  DRWS 2007  
writing is the most popular of the new services with perhaps 18 million users;  it 
was launched in 2006 but its success dates really from early 2009.  17 
Perhaps by now the point has been made; all of these operating systems, 
applications and services are in very wide use and within all are forensic traces 
that have significant potential for a very wide range of investigations.   The 
arguments about speed of change in relation to personal computers can be applied 
with at least equal force to cellphones, where major manufacturers release new 
models with new features and new opportunities for digital footprints to be created 
every 3 or 4 months.  
 
 
Digital Forensics Methodology 
 
Digital Forensic Research Methodologies easily conform to general expectations for 
scientific work in general and forensic science in particular.  Most of the popular 
operating systems and applications in use today are proprietary and closed source.  
The product is delivered together with a manual and “help” files to explain the 
functions and the menuing system, but there is no explanation of how the results are 
achieved.18  Few of the products are designed to have forensic qualities, such as full 
traces of alterations to data,  serialing of events and tamper-proofing of log files. The 
main exceptions are those designed for use in accounting,  banking and high security 
environments. 
In order to find in the majority of operating systems and applications material of 
forensic value, the researcher has to carry out an exercise in reverse engineering, in 
effect looking at how certain date/time stamps and files are created and changed when 
particular actions or events take place.  The researcher has to carry out many 
observations,  attempt to formulate rules which in effect say:  “When this event takes 
place,  the following changes always occur in and to the following files”.   These rules 
then have to be tested.   Once the rule is known it is possible to write software which 
will exploit it and turn it into something which an investigator can deploy. 
 
Table 5 shows a typical forensic research methodology.19 
 
There is no shortage of outlets for the would-be journal author. The International 
Journal of Digital Evidence is online only but adopts peer review.  It first appeared in 
2002. Digital Investigation is a conventionally published journal published by 
Elsevier which commenced in February 2004.  Others include:  International Journal 
                                                 
17 It is extremely difficult to keep up with the changes in the Social Networking scene. One semi-
reliable place to do so is:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_social_networking_sites 
 
18 The exception are “open source” products such as the Linux kernel and a variety of Linux-
related applications.  Here,  the products are generated by co-operation and the source code is 
published.  
19 For a fuller discussion see: An Examination of Digital Forensic Models,   Reith,  Carr  Gunsch, 
International Journal of Digital Evidence,  2002 1:3 
http://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/ijde/articles.cfm?action=article&id=A04A40DC-
A6F6-F2C1-98F94F16AF57232D 
of Forensic Computer Science (2006);  and  Journal of Digital Forensic Practice 
(2008).    
 
The first problem is persuading authors to prepare articles to an appropriate level of 
thoroughness.  Much of the discovery of new problems comes from law enforcement 
investigators.  Their priority is always the current case and then the backlog of cases 
awaiting examination.  Few law enforcement employers will allow their officers and 
civilian employees time to carry out proper research.  Although there are now 
academics specializing in computer forensics, all too often their articles are concerned 
with technically challenging but seldom-encountered phenomena such as 
steganography – the techniques of hiding one file within another, or relatively abstract 
methodological issues.  The second problem is the time taken by the peer-review and 
publication  processes.   Digital Investigation conveniently provides a publication 
history for each of its articles – when it was first received,  any revisions, and when it 
was accepted.  A non-rigorous examination shows that articles seem to take 3-4 
months to be accepted and then perhaps to appear 2-3 months thereafter.  This is 
probably relatively rapid when compared with similar processes in academic journals 
in general.  If we add to this period the time taken by the author to research and write-
up,  even at its best, articles will appear some 12 months after some-one has spotted 
the forensic potential a piece of software that is wide-spread use.   
 
In practice the main sources of information for the practitioner are relatively informal.   
There are two main wikis:  http://www.forensicswiki.org and 
http://www.forensicwiki.com/ both run by the “community”.  There are a large 
number of websites covering aspects of the topic;  some of these are run by 
enthusiasts for “the community” but others are primarily to sell products and services.  
The visitor has to decide for himself how much reliance to place on any of these;  the 
quality ranges from the excellent to the dreadful.   There are also a number of bulletin 
boards, some such as Digital Detective with a vetting policy for members,  others 
designed to support particular products (and sometimes tied to a maintenance 
subscription) and some open to all.   The main means of quality assurance on a 
bulletin board is the number of people who are prepared to comment on a problem 
and its solution.   There are also a number of blogs.  
 
A further important source of computer forensics intelligence comes from training 
schemes.  A number of these are largely designed to support particular products;  
others come from commercial institutes which also offer, for example,  training in 
computer management and security.  In the UK F320 is a well-supported self-help club 
largely founded by active law enforcement officers where trainers lecture on their 
experiences for free.    Universities also offer courses, from diplomas through 
undergraduate degrees to masters’ and doctoral degrees;  however these have to 
temper the delivery of practical advice with the need for their awards to meet 
generally accepted academic standards.   Most of these schemes do their best but what 
is not clear is how far all the information imparted has been properly tested. 
 
 
Testing facilities 
                                                 
20 http://www.f3.org.uk/ 
 
Let’s suppose we have some properly peer-reviewed items of technical knowledge of 
practical value in the investigation of computer hard-disks.  We need to turn this into 
a tool which can be deployed efficiently.   Most investigations can be carried out 
using a very small number of basic utilities;  but these utilities require a significant 
knowledge of operating systems,  programming and methods of recording data.  Their 
output may be difficult for the non-skilled to understand.  In addition the basic 
utilities can often only run one query at a time whereas a real investigation often 
requires high levels of iterative use.  
Three informal tests of the quality of a tool are the clarity and transparency of the 
accompanying documentation, the detail and candour of the change-log, and 
arrangements for the designer to get customer feedback.   The first ought to explain in 
detail the principles upon which the tool has been designed and what it is supposed to 
show;  the second demonstrates the routes taken by the designers and changes 
initiated to reach the current version.  The third is if the vendor has a bulletin board 
where customers can post their concerns about anomalies – this is a form of peer-
review.  Examples can be seen in relation to NetAnalysis, a tool for examining the 
caches of Internet browsers.21  But none of these approach what is normally meant by 
full independent testing.  
The best established scheme is run by the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST).22  It says of itself:   
“The testing methodology developed by NIST is functionality driven. The activities 
of forensic investigations are separated into discrete functions or categories, such as 
hard disk write protection, disk imaging, string searching, etc. A test methodology is 
then developed for each category….  After a tool category and at least one tool is 
selected by the steering committee the development process is as follows: 1 NIST and 
law enforcement staff develops a requirements, assertions and test cases document 
(called the tool category specification).  2  The tool category specification is posted to 
the web for peer review by members of the computer forensics community and for 
public comment by other interested parties.  3  Relevant comments and feedback are 
incorporated into the specification.  4 A test environment is designed for the tool 
category. 
“After a category specification has been developed and a tool selected, the test 
process is as follows:  1 NIST acquires the tool to be tested.  2  NIST reviews the tool 
documentation. 3 NIST selects relevant test cases depending on features supported by 
the tool. 4  NIST develops test strategy.  5 NIST executes tests  6 NIST produces test 
report  7  Steering Committee reviews test report. 8  Vendor reviews test report.  9  
NIST posts support software to web. 10   NIJ posts test report to web.” 
There’s little to object to there in terms of methodology and transparency.  The 
problem is that what has actually been tested since the NIST program started in 2002 
is only a tiny sub-set of the range of tools that are in actual use and which are 
                                                 
21 Manual incorporated in trial download: http://www.digital-detective.co.uk/downloads.; Change  
log: http://www.digital-detective.co.uk/changelog/netanalysis.pdf 
22 http://www.cftt.nist.gov/ 
routinely needed.  The fullest tests have been on disk imaging tools and on write 
blockers (devices to enable a hard-disk to be read while guaranteeing that no 
contaminating writing to the disk can take place).  For “deleted file recovery” and 
“string search”  (running a search across an entire hard disk to look for matches on 
groups of characters including words) there are simply draft specifications.  NIST has 
decided to value thoroughness over attempting to cover the territory.  
 
 
Digital Forensic Analysis Suites 
 
The testing methodology we have been discussing is directed at single-function tools, 
that is, a tool which sets out to exploit a single item of forensically useful knowledge.  
Such tools were common in the early days of computer forensics and some specialist 
tools are still popular.23  But in practice, that’s not how most digital forensic 
investigators operate. For convenience they prefer analysis programs which are in 
effect integrated suites which offer, among other things, safe forensic imaging of 
hard-disks, automated recovery of deleted files, a series of viewing environments for 
the contents of a disk, facilities for examining the contents of a range of complex 
files,  the ability to search across an entire disk,  facilities to extract material to 
produce exhibits, and the automated generation of reports.  Typical examples are 
EnCase 24and AccessData FTK25; there are a number of others. 26   
 
These tools are popular because they appear to be the only way in which the large 
number of computers presented for examination can be handled at all.   Strong 
anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a typical 6 to 8 month delay in non-urgent 
computer examinations in UK police forces.  But each of these analysis suites  
incorporates a very large number of items of “forensically-useful knowledge” and 
attempts to provide a meaningful way of exploiting all of them.  The vendors of these 
products usually try their best; they employ support staff to deal with queries and 
complaints, some of them have bulletin boards, most also offer training which brings 
them into close contact with practitioners.    
 
Table 6 shows, for Encase and AccessData FTK,  the frequency with which new 
versions, updates and bugfixes are released.  But none of these are tested in the sense 
that most forensic scientists and Daubert-like admissibility rules expect.   Experienced 
computer forensics specialists sometime try to address the problem of lack of testing 
by throwing two competing analysis products at the same task and seeing whether 
there is any different result.  Plainly this sort of approach will identify some 
                                                 
23 eg NetAnalysis (www.digitaldetective.co.uk) ;  P2P Marshall (http://p2pmarshal.atc-
nycorp.com/);  and various collections such as Maresware (http://www.dmares.com/) and the list 
at: http://www.forensic-computing.ltd.uk/tools.htm and http://www.forensix.org/tools/ 
24 http://www.guidancesoftware.com/computer-forensics-ediscovery-software-digital-evidence.htm 
25 http://www.accessdata.com/forensictoolkit.html 
26 For example:  X-ways forensics (http://www.x-ways.net/forensics/) ; ProDiscover 
(http://www.techpathways.com);  the open-source Autopsy (http://www.sleuthkit.org/); 
MacForensicsLab (http://www.macforensicslab.com/) 
anomalies which in turn will prompt further inquiry; however this won’t work if both 
products are operating on the same wrong assumptions.   
  
 
A reconsideration of forensic science within the expert role 
 
Where this leaves us is that if current proposals for certifying the output of forensic 
science labs and tests for the admissibility of scientific evidence are enacted strictly 
large sections of computer-related evidence will either not be allowed to emerge from 
the labs or be ruled inadmissible by the courts.  Digital evidence will have to be at 
least a year perhaps more behind the ways in which computers are used by 
organizations and individuals – and criminals. 
 
How do we take this forward?  Part of the problem is that too much of the public 
policy discussion about improvements to the provision of expert evidence to the 
courts has proceeded on the basis that the entire issue is “forensic science” as opposed 
to the other roles of the expert, which can involve evaluation and interpretation of 
ambiguous results27,  reconstruction of events, and the provision of background 
information about particular commercial practices,  technologies and socio-cultural 
phenomena.   
 
 
It is worth remembering that the function of the courts is, in criminal cases, to see if a 
prosecutor has assembled enough evidence to persuade that there should be a 
conviction under a specific statute or common law, and,  in civil cases,  to reach a 
conclusion in a dispute between citizens.  Science is an assistance in this process, not 
a determinant.  The difference can be crystallized around different usages of the word 
“proof”:  Scientific proof is the result of a process of investigation,  hypthosesis, 
testing, etc and results in a statement of what is always true (at least until some-one 
comes and falsifies it).  Legal proof is a collection of objects put in front of a court, 
coupled with testimony as to what has been seen and done and which results in one 
highly specific conclusion. 
 
It is unfortunate that the Law Commission in its Consultation Paper No 19028 felt that 
it was beyond its remit to look at the procedural issues of expert evidence29  and that 
the remit of the Forensic Science Regulator is “better forensic science labs.”  
 
In fact there is a route within the existing criminal procedure,  at least as it exists in 
England and Wales – it is  “Pre-hearing Discussion of Expert Evidence” under 
CrimPR 33.6.30.  I have written more extensively about this elsewhere31 but the Rule 
can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
27 See, for example:  Standards for the formulation of evaluative forensic science expert opinion, 
Cook, Evett, Jackson, Jones,  Lambert,   Science and Justice 49 (2009) 161–164. See also the 
remarks of Leveson, LJ,  quoted in the Times,   
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/columnists/article6913109.ece 
28 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp190.pdf 
29 para 1.12 
30 http://www.justice.gov.uk/criminal/procrules_fin/contents/rules/part_33.htm#33.6 
 
• Experts have an over-riding to the court, not their client or employer 
• A meeting can either be by mutual agreement or on the order of the court 
• The experts generate a document setting out areas of agreement and 
disagreement in relation to the expert issues, together with supporting 
reasoning 
• Other than that document, the contents of the meeting cannot be referred to 
without the court’s permission 
• At a pre-trial hearing a court may make binding rulings about the 
admissibility of evidence and about questions of law under section 7 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1987 sections 31 and 40 of the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act 1996 and section 45 of the Courts Act 2003 
There are several effects: 
• One would normally expect experts to agree on matters which are 
generally scientifically accepted – and for which there is support along the 
lines of the Daubert  tests 
• Where the area of knowledge is new or tools are relatively untested, 
opposing experts are committed to find agreement sufficient for the 
purposes of the immediate issues before the court without committing 
themselves to a more “universal” finding.  In order to do so, they may run 
demonstrations and tests for each others’ benefit 
• More broadly there are also opportunities for agreed technical 
explanations, agreed glossaries, and agreed demonstrations for the jury 
which could simplify and shorten trials where complex technical evidence 
is significant 
• The circumstances of such meetings would need to be settled at pre-trial 
hearings – PCMHs – and these would have to be appropriately funded 
• The Forensic Science Regulator would, as he formulates his regulations for 
laboratories, need to allow sufficient flexibility for the presentation of 
evidence which is not fully tested but which an expert is willing to justify 
for the immediate specific circumstances 
• There will be renewed pressure on judges in assessing the expertise of 
experts.  One way forward would be to allow, at a pre-trial hearing,  an 
opposing legal team to mount a challenge, or at least an investigation, of an 
opposing team’s expert  
• Judges, in summing up to a jury, may need to consider whether any special 
warnings about the quality of the evidence should be given. 
 
There is an even more radical procedural approach, which is to allow experts to 
discuss their differences in front of a court while dispensing with the usual 
                                                                                                                                      
31 Meetings between experts: A route to simpler, fairer trials? Digital Evidence Vol 5, Iss 304, pp 
146-152 
formalities of examination-in-chief,  cross-examination and re-examination.  In 
Australia this is referred to as “hot-tubbing” or more accurately, “concurrent 
expert evidence”32  In its current form it  is essentially a civil rather than a 
criminal procedure.   
The problem that ICT develops at a rate far faster than related forensic science and 
tools can be tested will not go away.  An inflexible “one size fits all” doctrine of 
forensic science and the circumstances of its admissibility runs the risk that its 
consequence will be the walking free from court of many accuseds where digital 
evidence is significant.  A careful adaptation of existing criminal procedures and 
re-evaluation of the totality of “expert evidence” might provide ways forward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Daubert Tests 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
is a decision of the US Supreme Court.  Most commentators 
extract four tests or factors from it;  but some also add the fifth 
one listed here. 
1. Empirical testing: the theory or technique must be 
falsifiable, refutable, and testable. 
2. Subjected to peer review and publication. 
3. Known or potential error rate and the existence 
4. Degree to which the theory and technique is generally 
accepted by a relevant scientific community. 
5. The existence and maintenance of standards and 
controls concerning its operation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:   Simplified History of Microsoft 
Operating Systems 
1984 MSDOS 3  First mature form;  
character based 
1988 MSDOS 4 Able to handle larger 
chunks of memory 
                                                 
32 See, for example Cheeseman, Elizabeth in Bar News: The Journal of the NSW Bar Association 
Summer 2006-2007);  Edmond:    Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert 
Evidence In Australian Civil Procedure, Duke Law School http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp 
 
1990 Windows 3 First mature graphical 
user interface – but 
sits on top of 
MSDOS;  later 
versions in 1992 and 
1993 (includes 
networking) 
1991 MSDOS 5-6 Better memory and 
disk handling 
1995 Windows 95 Graphical user 
interface is whole 
operating system – 
not just a program 
sitting on top of 
MSDOS 
1996 Windows NT4 Version aimed at 
professional use;  
improved networking;  
new system for 
storing data on disk - 
NTFS 
1998-9 Windows 98 & 
98SE 
Improvements on 
Windows 98,  better 
handling of world 
wide web;  USB 
2000 Windows 2000 Improvements on 
NT4 
2000 Windows ME Unsuccessful series 
of improvements to 
Windows 98 
2001 Windows XP Until recently the 
most successful 
implementation – 
facilities from both 98 
and NT 
2006 Windows Vista Replacement for 
Windows XP but 
widely disliked for 
slowness 
2009 Windows 7 Current Version 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Word processing 
1978  WordStar  (CP/M) 
1982     WordStar for MSDOS 
1982 Wordperfect (MSDOS) 
1983 Microsoft Word (MSDOS) 
1986   WordPerfect 4.2 
1989 Word for Windows 
1989     WordPerfect 5.1 (MSDOS) 
1993 Microsoft Word 6.0 
1997 Microsoft Word 97 
2000 Microsoft Word 2000 
2002 Microsoft Word XP/2002 
2003 Microsoft Word 2003 
2007 Microsoft Word 2007 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Browsers 
August 1995 Microsoft Internet Explorer 1 
November 1995 Microsoft Internet Explorer 2 
August 1996 Microsoft Internet Explorer 3 
September 1997 Microsoft Internet Explorer 4 
December 1997 Opera 3 
March 1999 Microsoft Internet Explorer 5 
June 2000 Opera 4 
December 2000 Opera 5 
August 2001 Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 
Novermber 2001 Opera 6 
January 2003 Opera 7 
November 2004 Firefox 1 
April 2005 Opera 8 
June 2006 Opera 9 
November 2006 Firefox 1.5 
October 2006 Firefox 2 
October 2006 Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 
June 2008 Firefox 3 
September 2008 Chrome public launch 
March 2009 Microsoft Internet Explorer 8 
July 2009 Firefox 3.5 
September 2009 Opera 10 
 
 
 Table 5:  Typical Digital Forensic Research 
Methodology:  artefacts on  hard disk. 
Create “clean” or “virgin” test environment 
Make forensic disk image 
Introduce changes to be observed 
Make further forensic disk image 
Look for all the changes 
Repeat until you can formulate a rule to describe what is 
happening 
Test rule 
Publish 
Develop tool 
Test tool 
 
 
 
Table 6:   Updates for Computer Forensic Analysis 
Suites 
Versions and Release Dates 
AccessData FTK 
1.60:  30/03/2005;  1.61: 10/03/2006; 1.62: 01/08/2006; 1.70 
26/01/2007; 1.70.1 12/04/2007; 1.71: 27/06/2007; 1.72: 18/04/2008; 
1.80: 27/06/2008; 1.81: 30/09/2008; 1.81.2: 21/01/2009 
EnCase Forensic 
3.20:  04/2002;  4.15:  10/2004; 5.05: 07/2006;  
6.5.1: 30/05/2007; 6.6:  26/072007; 6.8: 13/11/2007; 6.8.1.: 
15/12/2007; 6.10: 06/03/2008; 6.10.2: 06/04/2008; 6.11: 04/06/2008; 
6.11.2: 04/07/2008; 6.12: 20/11/2008; 6.12.1: 08/01/2009;  6.13 
07/03/2009; 6.14: 14/07/2009 
 
 
